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Abstract
This paper uses a large firm-level dataset of UK companies and informa-
tion on their pre-crisis lending relationships to identify the causal links from
changes in credit supply to the real economy following the 2008 financial crisis.
Controlling for demand in the product market, we find that the contraction
in credit supply reduced labour productivity, wages and the capital inten-
sity of production at the firm level. Firms experiencing adverse credit shocks
were also more likely to fail, other things equal. We find that these effects
are robust, statistically significant and economically large, but only when in-
struments based on pre-crisis banking relationships are used. We show that
banking relationships were conditionally randomly assigned and were strong
predictors of credit supply, such that any bias in our estimates is likely to be
small.
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Non-technical summary
The financial crisis of 2008 was associated with falls in corporate lending, business
investment, labour productivity and real wages in the United Kingdom. What were
the causal links between these events? Did firms retrench because they could not
get financing? Or did they become pessimistic about demand for their products and
demand less finance? This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the credit
supply shock on corporate outcomes in the UK. We employ a new identification
strategy - a means of disentangling demand and supply that exploits information on
pre-crisis lending relationships within a large firm-level dataset of UK companies.
In the UK, firms are required to register the identity of any party (a ‘chargeholder’)
that has a claim on the firm’s assets as collateral for a loan. We construct a proxy for
pre-crisis banking relationships by identifying UK banks among these chargeholders.
We show that these relationships are persistent, and that they help to predict the
amount firms borrow after the crisis.
During the financial crisis, different banks experienced different funding conditions
and tightened credit conditions to different degrees. This means we can identify the
variation in debt at the firm level that is likely to be due to changes in the amount of
credit supplied by banks, rather than the amount of credit demanded by firms. We
use this variation to quantify the impact of a change in total debt on firm outcomes.
We find that firms facing a 10% contraction in credit supply led, on average, to a
5-6% fall in capital per worker, a 5-8% in labour productivity and a 7-9% fall in
average pay. We also find that firms facing adverse credit supply shocks were more
likely to fail. Our results predict that a 10% decrease in credit supply would increase
the probability of bankruptcy by around 60%.
These parameter estimates are both statistically significant and economically large,
but only when instruments based on pre-crisis banking relationships are used. We
show that banking relationships were conditionally randomly assigned and were
strong predictors of credit supply, such that any bias in our estimates is likely to
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be small.
If we assume, as a polar case, that all of the fall in credit to firms since the crisis
was due to credit supply, our estimates suggest that the credit supply shock caused
by the recent financial crisis may explain around 5-8 percentage points of the 17%
shortfall in labour productivity relative to its pre-crisis trend by 2013, half of the
shortfall in wages, and nearly half of the pickup in company liquidations between
2007 and 2009.
A key limitation of our empirical design is that we are unable to say how persistent
these effects might be. People switch banks and look for other types of finance, which
means the strength of pre-crisis banking relationships as a proxy for changes in the
availability of credit to firms is likely to fade over time. Indeed, beyond 2009 our
identification strategy begins to fail as pre-crisis banking relationships have longer
to decay, and do so non-randomly.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 was associated with falls in corporate lending, business
investment, labour productivity and real wages in the United Kingdom. What were
the causal links between these events? Did firms retrench because they could not
get financing? Or did they become pessimistic about demand for their products,
and demand both less financing and fewer factors of production as a result? Em-
pirical research in this area is only just beginning to adequately address the issue of
causation.
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the credit supply shock on cor-
porate outcomes in the UK. Our aim is to identify the impact of the reduction in
credit supply following the 2007/8 financial crisis on labour productivity, investment
behaviour and average pay. We employ a new identification strategy that exploits
information on pre-crisis lending relationships within a large firm-level dataset of UK
companies.
In the UK, firms are required to register the identity of any party (a ‘chargeholder’)
that has a claim on the firm’s assets as collateral for a loan. We construct a proxy for
pre-crisis banking relationships by identifying UK banks among these chargeholders.
We show that these relationships are persistent, and that they help to predict the
amount firms borrow after the crisis.
We exploit the stickiness of these relationships, together with the fact that different
banks tightened credit conditions to different degrees, to generate exogenous varia-
tion in credit supply at the firm level. We then use this instrument for credit supply
to quantify the impact of a change in total debt on firm outcomes, controlling for
demand conditions in the product market.
Our identifying assumption is that banking relationships are only correlated with firm
outcomes through their effect on credit supply, conditional on the control variables
in our model. This puts our paper in a similar vein to Chodorow-Reich (2014),
Edgerton (2012), Paravisini et al. (2015), Amiti and Weinstein (2013) and Bentolila
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et al. (2013).
This assumption will be violated if the banks which cut lending most during the crisis
lent to firms which performed systematically worse, controlling for other observables.
This could be due to reverse causation (bad firms harming their banks) or common
causation (bad or risky decisions in several parts of the bank). We provide narrative
evidence that the main cause of variability in banks’ performance after the crisis was
not their corporate lending decisions. Our identification strategy also allows us to
report standard tests of overidentifying restrictions, which are typically not rejected.
Our parameter estimates are statistically significant and economically large, but only
when we address the endogeneity of credit volumes with two-stage least squares.
OLS estimates are typically much smaller in absolute value, and statistically less
significant. We show that this is consistent with the presence of large credit demand
shocks at the firm level.
We find that firms who faced a reduction in credit supply experienced larger falls in
labour productivity, capital per worker and average pay. Our results suggest that a
10% contraction in borrowing caused by credit supply led, on average, to a 5-6% fall
in capital per head, a 5-8% fall in labour productivity, and a 7-9% fall in average
pay for the affected firms.
We argue that the increase in the shadow price of capital caused firms to substitute
towards more labour-intensive forms of production, which in turn lowered labour
productivity growth. The estimated impact on labour productivity is large, sug-
gesting that lower credit supply may also have been associated with lower levels of
innovation and technological development. Average pay also fell further in firms
more exposed to the credit shock, and in similar proportion to labour productivity,
even though these firms were hiring labour in the same markets as less exposed firms.
This observation lends support to rent- or risk-sharing theories of wage determina-
tion (Van Reenen (1996)) - in other words, firms were able to share some of their
idiosyncratic productivity shocks with their workers. We also find that firms facing
adverse credit supply shocks were more likely to fail.
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Relative to the existing literature, our study makes two principal contributions. First,
our paper is the first to our knowledge to look at the effect of the credit shock
on labour productivity and wages in the cross section, both of which have been
puzzlingly weak in the United Kingdom and a number of other economies after the
financial crisis. Second, our paper is the first to use bank relationships to study the
credit shock in the United Kingdom, an economy which is both heavily dependent
on banks and which suffered a relatively large credit shock.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how
our work relates to existing studies of the impact of credit on corporate outcomes.
Section 3 provides a brief overview of the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables
in the UK since the 2008 crisis, and the structure of the UK banking system and
corporate sector. Section 4 presents the dataset used in our analysis. Section 5 sets
out our empirical methodology. Section 6 presents our results and compare them to
existing estimates from the literature. Section 7 discusses the economic significance
of our results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Existing literature
There are a number of studies that examine the importance of bank shocks on the
provision of the supply of loans.
Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that the transmission of monetary policy is stronger
for banks with less liquid balance sheets and that this affects their lending behaviour.
While they do not discuss the economic impact of this contraction in lending, others
have argued that this behaviour can lead to a slower growth. Peek and Rosengren
(1997) find that Japanese banks cut lending in the US following deterioration in
their parent banks’ capital positions. They then go on to show in a follow up paper
using regional data that this in turn affected US construction activity (Peek and
Rosengren (2000)). Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) use aggregate data to identify
the impact of a credit shock on the macroeconomy. They find that shocks to the
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excess bond premium leads to elevated risk aversion in the financial sector, and in
turn to a contraction in lending supply and economic activity.
A key challenge for research in this area is to disentangle firms’ demand for credit
from banks’ supply of loans. Microdata can help address this concern.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) use matched firm-bank data to quantify the impact of
a bank liquidity shock on the provision of loans to firms. More recently, others
have taken this a step further: using matched firm-bank data to track the effect on
overall economic activity. In particular, several papers have used exposure to different
lenders just before the 2008 financial crisis, as a means of generating cross-sectional
variation in credit supply during the crisis.
For the US, Greenstone and Mas (2012) use geographic variation in the pre-crisis
market share of different banks across the US, along with variation in the credit
crunch across banks, and finds that US counties in which poorly performing banks
had bigger market shares saw fewer new loans, less employment and fewer business
start-ups during the crisis. Edgerton (2012) uses data on lending relationships for
a sample of equipment finance loans to identify the impact of restricting supply of
credit to firms. He finds that variation across lenders accounted for around 17% of
the decline in aggregate equipment financing, or about one-third of the total decline
in financing of small businesses. Flannery et al. (2013) find that US firms which
had relationships with banks with higher non-performing real estate loans borrowed
less and invested less following the crisis. Chodorow-Reich (2014) measures banking
relationships by identifying the lead arrangers for a given firm’s syndicated loans.
Having found that bank-firm pairs are sticky, he uses ‘distressed’ lenders as a proxy
for restricted credit supply. He finds that employment fell more sharply during
the crisis among the clients of less healthy lenders, particularly when those clients
were small firms. The withdrawal of credit can explain roughly one-third of the
employment decline in the sample in the year following the Lehman collapse.
Outside of the US, Amiti and Weinstein (2013) use matched Japanese bank-firm data
over the period 1990-2010 to decompose loan movements into bank, firm, industry
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and common shocks. They find that idiosyncratic bank shocks have a large effect on
investment. Paravisini et al. (2015) estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using
matched Peruvian customs and firm-level bank credit data. They compare changes
in exports of the same product and to the same destination in order to account
for non-credit determinants of exports. They then compare the outcomes of firms
borrowing from different banks that were differently affected by the 2008 financial
crisis. Their results suggest that the reduction in credit reduced exports by raising
the variable cost of production. Bentolila et al. (2013) merge the Spanish credit
register with balance sheet data and find that Spanish firms who entered the crisis
with relationships to weak banks experienced larger falls in employment.
Ongena et al. (2013) examine how corporate outcomes of firms that are dependent
on credit differed from those that are not credit constrained. They focus on firms
located in Eastern Europe and Asia, since the region was not initially affected by the
global financial crisis. Their identification strategy relies on distinguishing between
3 types of banks according to whether they are domestic, foreign-owned or able to
borrow on international wholesale markets. They find that banks with access to
international wholesale funding cut back their lending by more than domestic banks;
and that firms dependent on credit from these banks had lower returns on asset
growth and lower revenue growth.
In summary, there is a small but growing literature using bank relationships to study
the effect of credit supply on corporate outcomes, principally borrowing, investment
and employment. Our paper is the first to do so in the UK, and to look at labour
productivity, capital investment and average pay.
3 Macroeconomic context
The UK experienced a deep and prolonged economic recession following the 2008
financial crisis.
Labour productivity fell significantly in the aftermath of the crisis, and has stag-
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nated since. This weakness in productivity has been puzzling, and is associated with
surprisingly strong employment rather than weak output. It has been weaker in
the UK than in many other advanced economies. A detailed discussed of the UK’s
productivity performance since the crisis is provided in Barnett et al. (2014).
The weakness in labour productivity has also coincided with a sharp fall in UK
corporate borrowing and real wages (Figure 1). A key outstanding question is the
extent to which the disruption in credit supply witnessed in the aftermath of the
2008 crisis has been a cause of the weakness in investment, productivity and wages.
Figure 1: UK macroeconomic data, relative to trend
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Source: ONS; authors calculations. Notes: The chart shows the percentage point difference of each data series
relative to its pre-crisis trend. Apart from GDP, all measures refer to the private sector. Real PNFC bank
credit refers to the stock of private non-financial corporation (PNFC) loans, excluding the commercial real
estate (CRE) sector, deflated using the GDP deflator. Trends are calculated as the log linear trend between
1993 and 2007 Q2.
3.1 Corporate access to credit in the UK
Firms in the United Kingdom are highly dependent on banks as a source of debt
finance. The top 6 banks account for 70% of the stock of lending to UK firms (Bank
of England (2013)). In fact, only about 250 firms have access to the public bond
market and they account for only 12% of private employment. In addition, it is
9
typically only larger firms that have access to equity markets with only a very small
fraction of small firms gaining access.1
In their reliance on banks instead of bond and equity markets, UK firms are much
closer to continental European firms than US firms; bank loans account for about
three-quarters of euro area corporate debt, about two-thirds in the UK, and about
one-quarter in the US (Pattani et al. (2011)).
Broadly speaking, the reason for firms’ reliance on bank lending is because the cost
of getting a rating from a credit reference agency is too high for many small firms
– a prerequisite required by investors who rely on these scores as a signalling device
about the riskiness and viability of the firm. As a result, firms without an external
rating have greater difficulty raising equity from capital markets2. In other words,
variation in the credit supplied by banks is, for most UK firms, coterminous with
variation in the overall level of credit available to them.
3.2 The UK banking industry
The major UK banks - Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank
of Scotland (RBS) - had very different experiences during the recent financial crisis.
Lloyds TSB and HBoS (Halifax Bank of Scotland) merged to form the Lloyds Banking
Group (LBG). LBG, together with RBS, were subsequently part-nationalised by the
UK government after a £50 billion capital injection in October 2008. Figure 2 shows
the premia on credit default swaps on the senior unsecured bonds of the big four
1A 2012 Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) report found that ‘a minority [of
SMEs] use equity finance’ and the proportions are ‘too small to show on a graph’ (van der Schans
(2012)). Instead, they find that half of all SME’s have used financial institutions to obtain finance.
The remaining half did not seek funding or used other means not listed in their survey. Overall,
BIS estimates suggest that in 2014 SMEs, which make up 97% of all firms in the UK, raised only
£1.1 billion from private external equity compared to nearly £40 billion from bank lending British
Business Bank (2014).
2More recently, firms have been able to raise equity from non-traditional sources (e.g. crowd
funding) but those markets are tiny in comparison to traditional capital markets, and were not very
relevant for the period in question anyway.
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UK banks, a measure that is highly correlated with their funding costs. These were
all very similar and at record lows before the crisis, but became high and dispersed
after.
A necessary condition for our identification strategy is that this dispersion was not
in large part caused by systematic differences in the health of UK banks’ corporate
loan books. Official narrative accounts of the failures of HBoS and RBS (FSA (2011)
and PCBS (2013)) support this idea, laying the blame instead on trading book losses
and reliance on wholesale funding. The key exception to this is the particularly large
losses made in RBS’ and HBoS’ commercial real estate (CRE) portfolios.
Figure 2: UK bank CDS spreads
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Source: MarkIT; authors calculations.
Commercial property played an important role during the financial crisis. The rapid
pickup in debt tied to commercial property investments prior to the crisis contributed
to the rapid acceleration in prices, and the subsequent falls in prices led to a sharp rise
in non-performing loans. While debt write-offs on CRE loans picked up to around 2%
after the crisis, this is likely to significantly understate the scale of non-performing
CRE loans on bank’s balance sheets. Recent Bank of England work suggests the
median rate of forbearance on CRE loans across banks reached 20%, with the worst
performing bank portfolio reaching nearly 50% (Benford and Burrows (2013)).
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Figure 3 compares the share of UK CRE loans for the big four UK banks in 2007
with the change in funding costs, proxied by the change in CDS premia between 2007
and 2009. There are only five data points, but the positive correlation supports the
notion that a banks’ exposure to CRE was correlated with the subsequent pickup in
its funding costs. For this reason, and in line with Bentolila et al. (2013), we exclude
CRE firms from our sample.
Figure 3: Bank exposure to CRE and change in CDS premia
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Source: Published annual accounts for Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, HBOS and RBS in 2007; MarkIT; authors
calculations. Notes: The proportion of commercial real estate (CRE) lending from each bank is calculated
as the stock of loans and advances to the UK non-residential property sector relative to the total loan book
(covering all countries). The non-residential property sector here includes lending to the construction sector -
to ensure consistency in reporting across banks. Data for HSBC are for for total European CRE lending as a
proportion of the total loan book (published UK data were not available).
Figure 4 compares the change in funding costs with each banks exposure to the non-
CRE corporate sector. As shown, no obvious relationship stands out. This supports
the idea that banks non-CRE corporate loan book did not cause the variation in
funding costs and balance sheet health in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
3.3 Credit supply following the financial crisis
By 2008, UK banks were under intense pressure to recapitalise. To help alleviate
funding pressure, some initiatives were set up by the government and the Bank of
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Figure 4: Bank exposure to non-CRE PNFCs and change in CDS premia
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Source: Published annual accounts for Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, HBOS and RBS in 2007; MarkIT; authors
calculations. Notes: The proportion of private non-financial corporation (PNFC) lending from each bank is
calculated as the stock of loans and advances to all industry sectors (excluding finance commercial real estate
(CRE)) relative to the total loan book (covering all countries). Data for HSBC are for for total European
PNFC lending as a proportion of the total loan book (published UK data were not available). Data for Lloyds
include loans to financial services (which were grouped together with business services in their annual published
accounts).
England (e.g. the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) and the Credit Guarantee Scheme
(CGS) in April and October 2008 respectively). However, banks themselves had
started to issue equity in order to improve their capital position. The top 4 UK
banks issued £58.9 billion and £60 billion in equity in 2008 and 2009 respectively,
but issued none in the years before and after that. Because the banks suffered shocks
for different underlying reasons, the timing and quantities issued varied by bank. For
example, HSBC issued no equity in 2008, but did so in 2009; Barclays issued equity
in 2008 but not in 2009; and RBS issued equity in both years3.
As a result, there was immense pressure on banks to cut back on lending, in particular
during the acute period of 2008 and 2009. By 2008, lending growth to UK non-
financial corporations had slowed down dramatically. Data from the Bank of England
suggest that annual (3-month on 3-month) growth rate in corporate lending fell by
20 percentage points between 2007 and 2008, after it had been growing at an average
3This is important for our identifying assumption as not all the banks failed and when they did
suffer serious problems, these were not occurring in unison.
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rate of roughly 10% a year in the previous decade.
By 2010, the UK banking system had stabilized and funding positions had improved
(although they still needed to build capital to move towards full Basel 3 compliance).
Most of this was done organically by seeking to increase the proportion of their books
funded by deposits.
This narrative chimes with the results presented in Section 6. We find that the
effects are strongest for 2008 and 2009 (although the instrument is weaker in 2009).
Our preliminary investigations found that by 2010 the results start to fade and the
instrument fails to hold. While this may be due to firms switching banks or ceasing
to trade, it is also consistent with the timing of capital issuance outlined above.
3.4 The link between credit and the real economy
Why should shocks to the availability of bank credit affect a firm’s level of investment,
productivity and average pay?
Consider a firm that produces gross output with two factors of production, capital
K and labour L. These are combined with a technology, indexed by A, to produce
a good or service, Y. For the sake of simplicity, using a Cobb-Douglas technology
yields:
Y = AKαL1−α
Firms require credit for a number of reasons. They might borrow to finance invest-
ment today, spreading the cost over future years and leveraging against future profit
streams. They might also rely on credit as a source of working capital, given that
sales revenues often arrive with a lag.
Suppose that the cost of credit increases or, equivalently, the availability of credit to
firms decreases. The effective cost of borrowing increases, raising the relative shadow
price of inputs which are financed by credit. All else equal, this will lead firms to
re-engineer their production processes away from credit financed inputs - most likely
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away from K and towards L. This can be shown in the following example. Assuming
firms’ profits are given by:
pi = pAKαL1−α − wL− rK
where p is the price of output, w is the wage rate and r the cost of capital.
Assuming firms choose their level of capital with the aim of maximising profits, a
positive shock to the cost of borrowing will lead to a reduction in the capital to
labour ratio.
K
L
=
(
αpA
r
) 1
1−α
This process of adjustment is unlikely to be immediate, and frictions in reallocating
resources within and across companies may mean that, in the short run at least,
factor proportions may differ from their long-run levels. Depending on the speed of
reallocation, the amount of output produced will be lower in the short run. It will
also affect measured labour productivity, or output per head, as the ratio of capital,
and perhaps other intermediates, to labour inputs will have fallen. This is illustrated
by the following expression:
Y
L
= A
(
Apα
r
) α
1−α
The effect on labour productivity could be even larger if lower levels of credit avail-
ability have a detrimental impact on technology A, either directly (Levine and Waru-
sawitharana (2014)) or because new capital embodies improved technology.
The impact on labour inputs is less straightforward. It may be that the reallocation
from capital to labour leads to upward pressure on wages and employment, as labour
demand increases. Alternatively, it may be that constraints to working capital make
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it harder to pay workers, preventing firms from borrowing against future orders or
invoice payments. This may lead to downward pressure on wages if firms share this
additional cost pressure across workers. In addition, firms may pass on lower labour
productivity on to wages, as the marginal product of labour is lower (Van Reenen
(1996)).
This highly stylised model suggests that a credit supply shock should lead to a:
• decrease in labour productivity
• decrease in the capital to labour ratio within firms
• decrease in wages, if firms pass through the cost shock to workers
4 Data
Our dataset is compiled from information taken from the Bureau Van Dijk FAME
database. This service extracts information from UK companies annual accounts
that are submitted to Companies House - the official government data repository
for all limited companies. Companies House is responsible for incorporating and
dissolving companies, and as such, all limited companies in the UK are required to
register with Companies House. The BvD database contains information on around
1.2m registered UK companies.
Companies House is a register for incorporated companies only: it excludes sole
proprietorships and partnerships.4 The Business Population Estimates (BPE)5 is the
only official data source in the UK that includes information on all firms, regardless of
incorporation status. It captures information on turnover and employment size.6 The
4Sole proprietorships and partnerships and firms that are run by either one or multiple self-
employed people respectively.
5See ONS (2013) for further details
6The BPE incorporates data from the government business register, the Inter-departmental
Business Register (IDBR), the ONS Labour Force Survey (LFS) and HMRC self-assessment data.
Company data is obtained from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), which contains
all registered businesses obtained from Companies House. For partnerships and sole proprietorships,
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BPE reports that there were just under 4.7 million enterprises in 2007 in the UK. Of
those, the vast majority– three-quarters– were sole proprietorships and partnerships,
which are not incorporated.7 Almost all the remaining 1.2 million were small firms
(less than 50 employees), however they accounted for only one-third of employment
and turnover. In contrast, firms with more than 500 employees made up less than
0.1% of all enterprises but accounted for almost half of all employment and turnover.
4.1 Sample selection
The aim of this study is to examine the impact on companies of a contraction in the
supply of credit from banks, measured through changes in companies’ total borrow-
ings. The key explanatory variable for our analysis is therefore the level of total debt
held by individual companies, which we define as the total amount of overdrafts,
short term loans and long term debt.
Since we are interested in examining the effects from the financial crisis, we select
a cohort of firms that had positive levels of total debt in 2007. We then track the
behaviour of these firms after the crisis. The total sample consists of around 85,000
firms.
The reporting criteria for Companies House, and therefore the BvD, varies by firm
size.8 Large companies are required to send their full balance sheet and profit and
loss accounts to Companies House; medium sized companies can send abbreviated
profit and loss accounts; and small companies can send abbreviated balance sheet
data and are not required to send profit and loss information. As a result, there will
be missing information on smaller firms.
in addition to IDBR, LFS has been used to obtain the estimates of unregistered businesses.
7These are self-employed individuals who were paying no employees other than themselves. They
make up 17% of total employment.
8In 2007, to be classified as a small (medium) company by Companies House, a firm had to meet
at least two of the following criteria for two consecutive years: (i) annual turnover was less than
£5.6 million (£22.8 million), (ii) the balance sheet total was less than £2.8 (£11.4) million, or (iii)
there were less than 50 (250) employees.
17
This raises two important issues when considering the sample for our analysis.
First, the panel is unbalanced. Not all firms submit information for each variable
in each period. This will depend on whether they meet the appropriate reporting
thresholds as well as whether they cease trading in subsequent years. To address
this, we construct both balanced and unbalanced samples. The balanced sample
contains firms that report the variables of interest in both years. The unbalanced
sample contains all firms in either year.
Second, since there are various accounting exemptions available for SMEs, they will
be under-represented in our sample relative to the population of companies.
To estimate how many firms are being excluded from our sample we use the SME
Finance Monitor. The SME Finance Monitor is the largest survey of SME bank
finance in the UK9. In 2011 it surveyed 5000 firms with up to 250 employees and
a turnover of less than £25 million between March - May 2011. Their results are
representative of the population and are stratified by size, sector and region. The
report highlights that almost half of all SME’s have never used any external funding
between 2006 - 2011, and very small firms make up the largest component of this.
We use this survey along with the BPE to estimate the number of firms that have
accessed external funding.
Table 1 compares the number of small, medium and large firms across three sources.
Columns 1 and 2 provide the breakdown in the BPE population dataset. As shown,
around 97% or 1.2 million active companies are classified as small. Columns 3 and
4 combine these data with estimates from the SME Finance Monitor to give an
estimate of the number of firms with bank debt. This suggests that around half
of all small firms have bank debt, or around 690,000 firms, but this still represents
around 96% of companies with bank debt.
Columns 5 and 6 show the number of companies in our sample. The reporting
exemptions mean that, of the original sample of 86,378 firms, the final sample for
analysis contains only 13,444 firms. Within this there are 4,150 small firms, making
9For details on the survey see BDRC Continental (2011)
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up 31% of our sample and representing less than 1% of the estimated total number
of small firms with bank debt. In contrast, we have 3,712 large firms, making up
28% of our sample, and representing nearly two thirds of the total number of large
firms.
This implies that there are a large number of firms missing from our sample who
may have debt, but have not submitted detailed accounts to BvD. These companies
are more likely to be small, and are significant in number. This means our estimates
will be unbiased with respect to the population that our sample represents, but will
not be representative of the wider economy. We return to the issue of aggregation
in Section 7.
Table 1: Total number of firms by size
Population Firms with debt Our sample
Number % Number % Number %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-49 1,186,115 97.32 689,247 96.30 4,150 30.87
50-249 26,690 2.19 20,551 2.87 5,582 41.52
250+ 5,920 0.49 5,920 0.83 3,712 27.61
Total 1,218,725 100.00 715,719 100.00 13,444 100.00
Source: ONS; SME Finance Monitor 2011; authors calculations. Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are
taken from 2007 ONS Business Population Estimates. Columns (3) and (4) are an estimate of
the total number of firms who have bank debt by firm size, based on estimates of the proportion
of firms with bank debt from the 2011 SME Finance Monitor. Columns (5) and (6) show the
number of firms in the final sample, consistent with the results shown in column (1) of Table 6.
4.2 Variable description and summary statistics
Table 2 compares summary statistics for key variables in our sample of firms in 2007.
These include:
• Total debt: The total amount of overdrafts, short-term loans and long-term
debt in a given year.
• Capital and capital per worker: The total amount of tangible assets, and the
total amount per employee.
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• Turnover per head: Total turnover divided by the number of employees. This
is our preferred measure of labour productivity, discussed in more detail below.
• Average pay: Total remuneration divided by the number of employees. This is
our measure of avereage wages.
• Employment: Total number of employees in a given year.
Measuring labour productivity from firm-level annual accounts is not straight for-
ward. Ideally one would want a measure of gross value added (GVA) per employee.10
GVA for each firm could be calculated as either the sum of (i) profits and wages or
as (ii) turnover minus non-labour intermediate costs.
We experimented with both approaches, and both have drawbacks. The two main
issues with (i) are lower reporting rates and the presence of negative values (since
firms reporting a loss could have negative GVA) which introduces difficulties when
comparing percentage changes over time. The main issue with (ii) is how best to
measure non-labour costs, which aren’t well reported in annual accounts. In any
case, the correlation between estimates of GVA per head and turnover per head were
high in our sample.11. For the remainder of this paper, results for labour productivity
refer to turnover per head.
The reporting rates vary significantly for each variable. Employment and average
pay have the lowest reporting rates. And, as is typically the case in firm-level data,
the distributions of all our variables are heavily skewed to the left. To ensure our
results are not disrupted by outliers, and as is now customary in this literature, we
use symmetric growth rates for our calculations. This is discussed in further detail
in Section 5.
10An alternative would be to construct estimates of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). However,
this not a trivial task in firm level data due to the variability in production function specifications
across firms.
11A simple regression of the change in turnover per head on the change in productivity, controlling
for 2 digit industries, yielded a coefficient of 0.8 for 2008 and 0.9 for 2009 and both were statistically
significant at the 1% level.
20
Table 2: Summary statistics, 2007
Variable Mean Median Min Max Obs
Total debt (£’000s) 36,755 345 0 753,000,000 86,378
[2,609,447]
Capital (£’000s) 14,497 261 0 31,400,000 78,461
[303,909]
Capital per worker (£’000s) 328 17 0 408,474 28,296
[5,025]
Turnover per head (£’000s) 347 120 -8 230,680 21,410
[2,549]
Average pay (£’000s) 34 28 0 3410 28,102
[43]
Employment 555 67 1 507,480 29,131
[6,014]
Total sample size 86,378
Notes: Total debt is the total amount of long term debt and short term overdrafts. Capital is the total
amount of tangible assets. Capital per worker is the total amount of tangible assets divided by the number
of employees. Turnover per head is the total turnover divided by number of employees. Average pay is total
remuneration divided by number of employees. Employment is the number of employees. Standard deviations
are shown in square brackets.
Table 11 (in Appendix B) compares an equivalently sized random sample of firms
that do not report information on total debt. As shown, this second sample of firms
is on average much smaller, both in terms of total capital and employment. They
also have much lower reporting rates across the set of variables, suggesting that a
large proportion are exempt from reporting more detailed financial information on
account of their size. Given the distinct differences between firms reporting positive
levels of debt and those without debt, one must exercise caution when generalising
from our sample to all firms in the UK.
Table 12 (also in Appendix B) shows the mean of the change from 2007 for key
variables in 2008 and 2009. There is a lot of variation across banks, but also across
years.
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4.3 Chargeholder information
Our identification strategy relies on information regarding pre-crisis relationships
between companies and individual banks. To get this we extract information on
registered charges from the BvD FAME database. Figure 5 shows the proportion of
our sample with a charge registered to each bank in 2007.
Figure 5: Registered charge by bank in 2007
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Notes: The chart shows the percentage of companies in the final sample for analysis with a charge registered
to each institution, consistent with the estimation in column (1) of Table 4.
A charge is the security a company gives for a loan and must be registered at Com-
panies House (the UK business registry) within 21 days. There are two types of
charge: a fixed charge is a charge or mortgage secured on particular property; and
a floating charge can be against all the company’s assets, such as stock in trade,
plant and machinery and vehicles. The BvD FAME database captures information
on persons entitled to an outstanding charge raised at Companies House. It also
includes information on when the charge was created and when it ended (when the
loan matured). The way in which we encode this information for our econometric
analysis is set out in Section 5.
Figure 6 shows the proportion of companies that started with an outstanding charge
in 2007 with one of the four major UK banks and tracks whether or not they still
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had an outstanding charge to that particular institution in subsequent years. By the
end of the sample period around 90% of companies still had an outstanding charge
registered to the same institution as they did in 2007.
Figure 7 shows the proportion of companies that started off with an outstanding
charge to one of the four major UK banks in 2007 and tracks whether or not a new
charge was registered with a different institution. The chart shows that by 2011 only
around 5% of companies had raised a charge with a different institution to the one
they had an outstanding charge with in 2007. This suggests banking relationships -
or at least the proxy in our dataset - appear to be very sticky.
5 Empirical approach and identification strategy
5.1 The baseline regression specification
Our aim is to quantify the effect of a credit supply shock on various aspects of
firm performance and behaviour, principally labour productivity, capital per worker,
wages and firm survival.
The first question to address is how to quantify the size of the shock itself. If a firm
suffers a negative credit supply shock, the amount it borrows will tend to fall. One
natural and convenient choice of metric is therefore the amount of debt a firm has
borrowed. Our baseline equation is thus
∆yit = β0t + β1t∆dit + β2txit + it (1)
where i indexes firms, t is time, d is the stock of a firm’s debt, y is the response
variable of interest and x is a vector of observable firm characteristics. The vector of
observables x is chosen to make the residual variation in pre-crisis firm characteristics
uncorrelated with our instrumental variable, and comprises the following variables:
2-digit industry sector; whether the firm is a subsidiary, a parent company or a
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Figure 6: Average loan durations
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Notes: This chart shows the proportion of companies with an outstanding charge to the same institution to
that in 2007. It is based on the full sample of 86,378 companies with positive levels of debt in 2007. This
analysis only includes firms with charges linked to Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS.
Figure 7: New loans with other banks
0
5
10
15
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Percent of companies with a  
registered charge in 2007
Notes: This chart shows the proportion of companies with an outstanding charge in 2007 that have registered
a new charge with a different institution over time. It is based on the full sample of 86,378 companies with
positive levels of debt in 2007. This analysis only includes firms with charges linked to Barclays, HSBC,
Lloyds and RBS.
24
standalone firm; the log level of turnover in 2007, and firm age in 2007 at time t.1213
The amount a firm borrows will be driven by both the supply of and demand for
credit. For example, a firm might reduce borrowing because of a reduction in credit
supply, but also because it might want to dispose of physical capital or otherwise alter
its capital structure. In each case, the correlation between credit and investment will
be different. So a simple OLS regression of, say, investment on the change in debt
will typically deliver biased estimates of the effect of a credit supply shock.
To see the determinants of the OLS bias, consider a very simple model of borrowing,
d, output, y, and credit supply (perfectly elastic at interest rate r) at the firm level.
d =α1y + α2r + d (Credit demand)
r =s (Credit supply)
y =γ1s + y (Output)
In terms of the exogenous shocks of the model, realised output and borrowing are
given by
d =α1 (γ1s + y) + α2s + d
= (α1γ1 + α2) s + α1y + d
y =γ1s + y
If we were simply to regress output on credit volumes, the expected value of our OLS
12We add a value of 1 to the level of turnover in order to include firms with zero turnover.
13When firms cease to operate, the left-hand side variable is typically not recorded or recorded at
zero such that the log difference is undefined. We use symmetric growth rates - as is now common
in this literature - to measure ∆yit and ∆dit. For instance, taking a variable z, the change in z
from 2007 to t is calculated as follows
∆zt =
zt − z2007
0.5 (zt + z2007)
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parameter estimate would be
E
[
βˆOLS1
]
=
cov(y, d)
var(d)
=γ1
σ2s (α1γ1 + α2)
(α1γ1 + α2)
2 σ2s + α
2
1σ
2
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2
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α1σ
2
y
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2 σ2s + α
2
1σ
2
y + σ
2
d
The OLS estimator is biased for two reasons. First, the bias is an increasing function
of α1σ
2
y - i.e. output shocks will bias the OLS parameter upwards to the extent that
borrowing is an increasing function of output and that there are output shocks in the
sample. Intuitively, if credit volumes are strongly increasing in output, and output
varies autonomously a great deal, the parameter estimate in an OLS regression of
output on credit volumes will be biased upwards. Secondly, credit demand shocks
will bias the parameter towards zero, as they will raise the variance of the right-hand
side variable in the regression.
For this reason, we adopt an instrumental variables approach. For each of the firms
in our sample, we have information about the identity of any legal person with a
charge on the assets of the firm. When the chargeholder is a bank, we take this as
evidence of a possible banking relationship between the firm and the bank. These
relationships are in turn an indicator of firm-specific credit supply on account of two
features of the UK banking system in the recent crisis: the exogenous differences
across banks in the severity with which they were hit by the credit shock (Section
3.2), and the stickiness of banking relationships (subsection 4.3).
The banking relationship b is correlated with credit supply but uncorrelated with
any of the other shocks, such that b = µs + b. In expectation, our IV estimator is
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then
E
[
βˆIV1
]
=
cov(y, b)
cov(d, b)
=
E [(γ1s + y) (µs + b)]
E [((α1γ1 + α2) s + α1y + d) (µs + b)]
=
γ1µσ
2
s
µ (α1γ1 + α2)σ2s
=
γ1
(α1γ1 + α2)
This coefficient provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of credit supply shocks
on output normalised by their effect on borrowing.
Concretely, our regression specification is the following two-stage least squares model:
∆dit = θ0t + θ1tbi,2007 + θ2txit + µit (2)
∆yit = β0t + β1t∆dit + β2txit + it (3)
where bi,2007 is a vector of seven indicator variables for the identity of the bank with
which firm i had relationship with before the crisis.
The first four indicator variables represent a firm having a relationship with exactly
one of the big four banks - Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds (including HBoS) and RBS
(including NatWest). In view of the relative infrequency with which other banks
appear in our sample, the remaining three respectively code for a relationship with
a bank outside the big four, and a relationship with a non-bank, or a relationship
for which there is no assigned chargeholder. We exclude observations for which a
firm has more than one banking relationship with the big 4. These firms tend to
be different and we find that our exclusion restriction does not hold for that group.
These constitute only 6% of firms.
Our IV results are qualitatively robust to reasonable alternatives to this scheme. For
example, we get similar results when we separately code relationships with the big
banks, irrespective of whether the firm has relationships with other banks.
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One reasonable alternative to this specification would be to group banks according
to whether they are strong or weak, and therefore more or less likely to provide
credit, and then perform a difference-in-differences analysis comparing firms who
have relationships with these two groups. The problem with this approach is that
it is not obvious how to group banks. On one hand, banks like RBS and Lloyds
became so weak that they were nationalised. On the other, nationalisation itself
may have prompted a change in lending policy and actually boosted credit supply
from the affected banks (see Rose and Wieladek (2014) for evidence that nationalisa-
tion affected the lending of UK banks). Furthermore, banks facing tougher funding
conditions may have had more of an incentive to provide loan support or forbear-
ance to weaker firms to avoid having to realise further losses on their balance sheet.
This might have had a positive impact on measured lending. For example, latest
estimates suggest the scale of forbearance across non-CRE SME borrowers is likely
to have been relatively small by 2013, but could have been higher immediately after
the crisis (Arrowsmith et al. (2013)).
Conversely, our two-stage least squares approach does not require us to make as-
sumptions about the ranking of banks, but uses the variation across all banks to
identify the impact of the credit shock. This methodology allows us to be agnostic
about which banks restricted credit and why.
Equation (1) is essentially a time-differenced version of the specification in Paravisini
et al. (2015). Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of firms, so we could in principle
estimate a variant of equation (1) in levels terms rather than first differences, con-
trolling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity using standard methods. This
approach would, however, suffer from a number of important problems. Most ob-
viously, the credit shock itself varied over time and affected each bank differently
over our sample. Furthermore, our identifying strategy, explained in detail below,
relies on using pre-crisis banking relationships as an instrument for firm-level credit
supply. Over the passage of time banking relationships will change and end for a
variety of reasons. This means that the coefficients of equation (2) are highly likely
to be unstable over time, and we verify that this is the case in the next section.
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We therefore estimate our model in terms of changes between the year 2007, before
the most serious phase of the credit crisis, and each of the post-crisis years 2008
and 2009 in our sample. Beyond 2009, our identification strategy begins to fail as
pre-crisis banking relationships have longer to decay, and do so non-randomly, so we
do not present results for later years.
5.2 Firm survival
An important question is whether the attrition in our sample due to firms ceasing
to operate is random or not with respect to the other variables in our model. It
seems likely that changes in credit supply will influence firm survival. Indeed, with
our dataset we can also quantify the impact of credit supply shocks on firm survival.
The right hand side of our regression model only includes time-invariant variables
observed in 2007. This means that we can evaluate the predicted change in a firm’s
borrowing among dead firms, in other words how much a firm with similar pre-crisis
characteristics would have been expected to borrow had it survived. This is a natural
metric with which to assess the impact of predicted borrowing, and in particular the
contribution of bank identity to it, as a determinant of firm survival. We construct
a binary cumulative failure indicator fit taking the value of zero if firm i is alive in
year t and 1 if the firm failed in or before year t.14 We then run logit regressions
of firm failure or survival on the predicted value of credit supply, plus the non-bank
controls in equation (2)
f ∗it =αt∆̂di + βtxi + uit (4)
Pr(f ∗it > 0) =F (α∆̂di + βxi) (5)
The estimated coefficient on credit supply will therefore capture the effect that credit
supply, as identified with bank ID and measured in units of credit volumes, has on
14We create a proxy for firm death by looking at whether a firm’s status (when the data were
collected) is not ‘active’ and looking for the first year in which balance-sheet data such as assets
are either zero or missing: we assume the firm failed in that year.
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bank survival. A negative coefficient would mean that firms which would have been
able to borrow more, had they survived, would have been less likely to fail.
In principle, a reasonable alternative would be to estimate responses for both contin-
uous left hand side variables and firm survival jointly, e.g. through a Heckman-type
model. The problem is that with our data we lack an additional exclusion restric-
tion and would need to rely on distributional assumptions and the curvature of the
inverse Mills ratio for identification. For this reason, we focus here on the ques-
tion of whether factors that predict credit supply among surviving firms also predict
whether a firm survives at all.
5.3 Identification
Our identifying assumption is that a firm’s banking relationships are correlated with
its performance, conditional on observables, but only through the effect that bank
identity has on credit supply. In terms of equations 2-3, these assumptions are
respectively
E[∆dibi] 6= 0 (6)
E[itbi] = 0 (7)
Section 3 explained in detail the stickiness of banking relationships, which suggests
that pre-crisis relationships will be a determinant of post-crisis borrowing opportu-
nities. Subsection 6.1 below confirms statistically that pre-crisis relationships are
very strong predictors of post-crisis borrowing. Together, these pieces of evidence
establish that equation (6) - the relevance of our instruments - holds.
On the question of instrument validity, equation (7), there are two principal reasons
why our identifying assumption might fail. The first possibility is reverse causation,
in other words did firm performance lead to changes in credit supply rather than the
other way round. If the firms who had relationships with a given bank performed
systematically worse (conditional on observables) than others, say because that bank
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had selected riskier or less promising borrowers than others, causation could run from
corporate performance to bank relationships - violating our identifying assumption.
This reverse causation seems unlikely in practice. Section 3 sets out narrative evi-
dence that the main cause of variability in banks’ performance after the crisis was
not their corporate lending decisions (apart from in commercial real estate (CRE)).
Given that we exclude CRE firms from our sample, we are omitting the major poten-
tial source of reverse causation from our sample. The second possibility is selection
on unobservables, whereby a firm’s performance and the lending behaviour of its
bank are influenced by a common, unobserved factor. For example, suppose a given
bank took above-average risks on both sides of its balance sheet in the lead-up to
the crisis. In the event of a system-wide financial shock, its lending would have con-
tracted more than average on account of funding difficulties, and its borrowers may
have performed less well than average because they were more exposed to the eco-
nomic cycle. We would then observe a conditional correlation between performance
and borrowing at the firm level, but it would not be causal - another violation of our
identifying assumption.
We provide three pieces of evidence which suggest that selection on unobservables is
not present in our sample to a significant extent.
First, there was no significant correlation, conditional on our other observables, be-
tween bank relationships and our left-hand side variables before the crisis. If banks
had been selecting firms based on their characteristics, such as level of riskiness, then
we might expect to see statistically significant differences in our response variables y
across banks conditional on observables characteristics before the financial crisis. We
estimate the following equation for a series of outcome variables, denoted by yit, in
the period before the financial crisis. The outcome variables are gross profit, capital,
employment, capital per head, turnover per head, and average pay and the equation
is estimated using data from 2005 - 2006
∆yit = φ0 + φ1bankit + φ2xit + t+ eit
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where ∆yit is the symmetric growth rate between (2005 and 2006), bankit are the
same set of bank indicator variables for whether the firm had a charge with one
of the big four banks, another financial institution or a non-financial institution in
2007. The equation tries to capture whether some firms who had a charge with a
certain bank grew faster than others before the financial crisis. We test whether
the coefficients on the vector φ1 of bank dummies are jointly equal to zero. Table 3
reports p-values from the joint F-test. The p-values show that we cannot reject results
for the coefficients jointly being equal to zero on all outcome variables (although
capital per head is slightly significant at the 10% level).
Table 3: Joint F-test of significance of bank dummies
∆yi,2006−2005 P-value
Gross Profit 0.611
Capital 0.081
Employment 0.486
Capital per head 0.159
Average pay 0.215
Turnover per head 0.823
Notes: Table reports p-values from
joint F-test of the bank indicator vec-
tor banki,2006−2005, where the depen-
dent variable is the ∆yi,2006−2005
Second, and relatedly, in subsection 6.3 below we re-run our baseline two-stage least
squares analysis but move the sample dates and selection rules two years back in
time, attempting to predict response variables in 2006 and 2007 - before the most
serious phase of the crisis - on the basis of banking relationships in place in 2005.
We show that our instrument is not relevant before the crisis. The second stage
regressions are also largely insignificant. This further supports the idea that there is
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no common causation driving our results.
Third, subsection 6.1 reports standard tests of overidentifying restrictions, which are
typically not rejected at standard significance levels. Taken together, this evidence
suggests that our instrument is both valid and relevant.
5.4 Standard errors
We calculate standard errors for our baseline regressions using a heteroscedasticity-
robust estimator. At first sight, it might be warranted to cluster our estimates at the
bank level. However, our instrument is already a bank-level fixed effect, making this
redundant. Our first-stage equation regresses the change in debt at the firm level on
the bank relationship dummies and other controls. Any variation that is common at
the bank level will be absorbed by the bank dummies.
For the second-stage equation, our identifying assumption is shown in (7). This
means that any residual variation at the bank level, of the sort that would require
clustering of standard errors, would amount to a violation of our identification re-
strictions. In other words, if our standard errors are biased by not clustering, then
so are the parameter estimates themselves. We provide evidence elsewhere in favour
of our identifying assumptions. Furthermore, we have calculated clustered stan-
dard errors (not shown) and confirmed that they are generally very close to simple
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates.
We calculate standard errors and significance levels for the firm survival model (4)-(5)
by bootstrap resampling with replacement from our full dataset. This is necessary
because the samples for equations (4) and (5) are different, such that normal IV
formulae for standard errors are not applicable.
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6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
6.1.1 First stage regression
Table 4 sets out the results of the first stage regression (equation (2)) of the change
in credit volumes on our vector of identifiers for bank relationships bi,2007. The first
columns show results from an unbalanced panel of firms while the second two columns
show results for the balanced panel of firms who have data available in both years15.
The identities of the banks themselves are anonymised.
The last two rows of the table show that the regression as a whole, as well as the
joint test on θ1t, is highly significant. The coefficients on bi,2007 themselves are pre-
cisely estimated and in many cases bilaterally significantly different from each other.
Coefficients on the other control variables are not reported for the sake of brevity.
6.1.2 Second stage regression
Tables 5 - 7 set out our main (second stage) results from equation 3. Each table
shows all possible permutations of the time period in question (changes from 2007-
2008 and 2007-2009), whether the sample is unbalanced or balanced (whether we
restrict attention to observations available in both years) and for for both OLS or
IV estimation of equation (3). We report the elasticity, β1t, on the change in debt,
∆dit. We also report the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, the
Kleinbergen-Paap F-Statistics of weak instruments and the P-value from the Angrist
and Pischke F-test of excluded instruments from the first stage of the regression.
We first present results for capital per worker in Table 5. In both years, and for both
the balanced and unbalanced sample, the OLS estimates of β1t are much smaller than
15Note that firms which cease operation are also included in our sample. They are recorded as
having zero output
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Table 4: First stage, baseline sample
Unbalanced Balanced
2008 2009 2008 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank 1 -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.092*** -0.067***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Bank 2 -0.065*** -0.086*** -0.081*** -0.084***
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Bank 3 -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.077*** -0.057***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Bank 4 -0.054*** -0.044** -0.057*** -0.043**
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
Other financial institution -0.042 -0.051 -0.075** -0.031
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
Non financial institution -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.047**
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,444 11,418 10,471 10,471
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009
F statistic 3.692 3.911 8.939 3.840
P-value of regression 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-value of all banks 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level. P-values
in square brackets. Table shows results from regressions on the change in debt, ∆debtit, on a
vector of bank dummies in 2007. ∆debtit is calculated using symmetric growth rates . Each column
represents a cross-sectional regression for the change in time t relative to 2007, where t is (2008, 2009).
Regressions control for industry sector, firm entity type, age and log level of turnover in 2007.
Balanced columns control for number of firms that have data recorded in both years. Data are
restricted to firms who have a positive level of debt in 2007.
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their IV counterparts (although both are also statistically significant). In view of the
argumentation in Section 5, this attenuation bias from OLS is consistent with most
changes in firm borrowing being due to credit demand unrelated to the firm’s operat-
ing business - i.e firms managing their balance sheets. Turning to the IV estimates,
the coefficient for the unbalanced and balanced samples are similar in magnitude; the
effects vary somewhat by year and sample, but by less than one standard deviation.
Taken together, the IV results suggest that a 10% fall in borrowing due to a credit
supply shock leads to a 5-6% reduction in capital per head. This suggests that a
credit supply shock has large effects on the capital intensity of production at the firm
level.
The diagnostic tests reported with the regression suggest that any bias in this esti-
mate is unlikely to be very large due to any issues with instrument validity and/or
relevance, especially in 2008: the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (where
the null is that our instruments are valid) is not rejected at standard levels for ei-
ther year, while the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments suggests
that the probability of a large weak instrument bias is low for 2008 (Stock and Yogo
(2002)).
Table 6 shows the results for turnover per head, our measure of labour productivity,
as the dependent variable. Once again the IV estimates of β are reasonably well-
determined and much larger in absolute value than their OLS analogues although, in
contrast to the capital-per-head regressions, the latter are not statistically significant.
The coefficients do get somewhat smaller over time, perhaps as firms have more time
to adjust their factors of production. The OLS estimates of β1t are economically very
small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, our IV estimates are economically
large and relatively precisely estimated. One again, diagnostic suggests suggest any
bias from weak or invalid instruments is unlikely to be large.
Interpreting the numbers, columns (2) and (6) shows that a credit shock that reduces
a firm’s level of borrowing by 10% by 2008 or 2009 reduced labour productivity by
8% and 5-6% respectively. These are of a magnitude equal or proportionally larger
than the effect of credit on capital per worker, a large effect. As shown in subsection
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3.4, capital per worker is one component of measured labour productivity, technology
is another. It could be that lower capital investment may have been associated with
lower levels of innovation and technological development.
Table 7 shows our estimate of the impact on average pay. As above, the IV estimates
are much larger in absolute value than their OLS analogues, and suggest that a firm-
level credit shock reduces wages in approximately the same proportion as it reduces
productivity. This suggests that firms were able to share some of the costs from the
credit shock with their employees. It also suggests these firms were operating in a
labour market that was non-Walrasian to an important extent, such that wages were
not equalised across similar employees but differed ex post according to the credit
supply experienced by their employers. Comparing them to Table 6, it seems that
firms in our sample cut wages by roughly the same degree as labour productivity,
supporting the notion that workers are paid their marginal product. In line with the
results above, the diagnostic tests suggest that our our instruments are strong and
valid in 2008, but less so in 2009.
When comparing IV estimates across our three response variables, the estimated
parameters are typically closer to zero in 2009 than in 2008, and our instruments
are typically weaker and closer to being invalid. Consistent with this, when we
extend our analysis for 2010 and 2011, we find that our results completely fade:
the instrument is measured as weak and the estimates of β1 in the second stage are
poorly determined and widely dispersed.
There are four possible reasons, two econometric and two economic, as to why this is
the case. First, the instruments are weaker for 2009, which may be one reason why
the estimated coefficient is smaller in absolute value (i.e. it may be biased towards
the OLS parameter). Second, the sample shrinks between the two years, in part
because some of the firms in the 2008 sample had gone bankrupt or become inactive
by 2009. In the (likely) event that some of this attrition is non-random with respect
to credit supply, the effect we observe among surviving firms will be different; it is
noteworthy in this regard that the difference between the estimates for 2008 and 2009
is smaller on the balanced sample. Appendix A below shows that sample attrition
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may invalidate our Hansen-Sargan statistics, leading to spurious rejections of the null
of valid instruments. Third, the effect of a persistent credit shock on productivity
may fade over time, as firms have more time to reorganise production or finance
expenditures through other means. Fourthly, the dispersion of credit supply across
banks may have fallen in those latter years. The top 4 UK banks issued £120 billion
in equity in 2008 - 2009, but not after that. As a result, the pressure on banks to cut
back on lending, may have eased in 2010 and 2011 as their capital positions started
to improve.
6.2 Firm survival
Table 8 sets out our estimates of the parameter α in equation (5), the effect of a
reduction in credit supply on the probability of firm death. The results are negative
and significant for all years under consideration. A negative parameter means that
higher predicted credit supply (the amount a firm’s borrowing would have changed,
conditional on survival, based on its banking relationships and other observables)
increases the probability that the firm survived up until the period in question. This
suggests that a widespread contraction in credit supply will tend to increase corporate
insolvencies across the economy, an effect we quantify in Section 7
Table 8: Firm survival logit regression, baseline sample
(1) (2)
2008 2009
Predicted debt -6.26*** -5.27***
[1.08] [0.82]
Controls YES YES
Observations 82,624 82,709
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients for α in equation (5).
41
6.3 Placebo test
Our identifying strategy works by exploiting variation across banks in the changes
in the terms on which they supplied credit during the financial crisis. This variation
was likely to have been relatively large during the period of funding and credit mar-
ket turbulence, asset-price volatility and bank nationalisation of 2008-9. Conversely,
if our instruments are valid and banking relationships are randomly assigned with
respect to corporate outcomes, our instruments are more likely to be only weakly
relevant at a time of tranquil market conditions. But if there is also endogenous
variation in bank relationships that is relevant for credit supply and corporate per-
formance, violating our identifying assumptions, then our instruments could turn out
to be relevant when they should not be.
With this in mind, we re-run the regressions above but substitute 2005 in place of
2007 for our sample selection rule16 and as the base year against which changes in
debt, labour productivity and so on are measured.
Table 14 (in Appendix B) presents the results from the coefficient on the ∆debtt−2005,
analogous to the first row of the balanced regressions seen in Tables 5-7. In contrast to
our baseline results, the F-statistics for the first-stage regressions and the associated
IV estimates of β are typically insignificant at standard levels. The only exception to
this is when turnover per head is the dependent variable and the change is measured
between 2005 and 2007, in which case the coefficient on change in debt is significant
at the 10% level. This could be a false positive, or could suggest that the market
turbulence experienced in the second half of 2007 may already have been having an
effect on the real economy. However, in no case are our instruments relevant in 2006,
a time of uniformly easy funding conditions across UK banks.
Both the failure of the placebo test and the lack of evidence of pre-selection of firms
by banks before the crisis, provides greater confidence that our instrument is picking
up credit supply shocks - and nothing else - in our baseline results for 2008 and 2009.
16We select firms in the Bureau Van Dijk database who had a positive level of debt in 2005 rather
than 2007
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7 Economic magnitude
This section provides a set of simple illustrations to demonstrate the economic sig-
nificance of our results, by translating our microeconometric findings into macroe-
conomic numbers. These calculations, although very broad bush, imply that the
impact of the credit shock on the macroeconomy may have been substantial.
Turning first to our baseline estimates. Table 9 sets out some simple steps to examine
the possible contribution of the credit supply shock induced by the financial crisis
on capital per worker, labour productivity and average pay.
To begin with, the first row looks at the deviation in the corporate debt stock,
relative to its pre-crisis trend. Recent research by the Bank of England suggests
that the vast majority of the initial fall in aggregate lending was due to credit supply
shocks, rather than decreased demand (Barnett and Thomas (2014)). For the sake of
illustration, lets suppose that all of the fall in the corporate debt stock by 2009 was
due to restricted credit supply, and half of the fall by 2013. The intuition being that
banks drove the immediate contraction in credit in the aftermath of the crisis, and as
demand conditions worsened firms will have demanded less credit. We multiply this
by the proportion of firms with debt and the relevant elasticity estimate from our
regressions, to derive some simple predictions of the aggregate impact of the credit
shock.
These estimates suggest that the credit supply shock could have lowered the level
of labour productivity by 1-2% by 2009 and 5-8% by 2013. This compares to an
aggregate shortfall of -10% by 2009 and -17% by 2013. Barnett et al. (2014) argue
that by the end of 2013, structural factors - including reduced investment in physical
and intangible capital, and impaired resource allocation - could explain around 6-9
pp of the deviation relative to pre-crisis trend. Our results are in a similar ball park,
and suggest that the credit supply shock could have been a major underlying cause
behind these factors.
These estimates predict that the level of capital per worker would be 1-2% by 2009
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and 5-6% by 2013. One serious consideration to bear in mind here is comparability
of the data. The measure of capital used in our data is the level of tangible assets
among non-CRE PNFCs. The aggregate capital stock includes a wider variety of
assets across all PNFCs. Nonetheless, they suggest that by 2013 a large part of the
6% deviation in capital per worker may have been driven by reduced credit supply.
These estimates also suggest that the credit shock would have contributed to lower
levels of average pay - by around 2% in 2009, and 7-9% in 2013 or up to a third of
the deviation in real wages relative to their pre-crisis trend.
Table 9: Economic significance, baseline regressions
Capital per head Turnover per head Average pay
Calculation step % % %
Corporate debt relative to pre-
crisis trend, 2009 (a)
-5 -5 -5
Proportion of fall in debt due to
credit supply, 2009 (b)
100 100 100
Corporate debt relative to pre-
crisis trend, 2013 (c)
-34 -34 -34
Proportion of fall in debt due to
credit supply, 2013 (d)
50 50 50
Impact of 1% change in credit
supply (e)
0.5 to 0.6 0.5 to 0.8 0.7 to 0.9
Proportion of firms with bank
debt (f)
60 60 60
Predicted aggregate impact, 2009
(a)x(b)x(e)x(f)
-1 to -2 -1 to -2 -2
Actual deviation relative to pre-
crisis trend, 2009
3 -10 -10
Predicted aggregate impact, 2013
(c)x(d)x(e)x(f)
-5 to -6 -5 to -8 -7 to -9
Actual deviation relative to pre-
crisis trend, 2013
-6 -17 -27
Source: ONS; authors calculations.
Turning to firm survival. In a logistic regression, such as that defined by equations
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(5), the slope parameter α implies that a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable
increases the odds of the event by a factor eα. So our estimate of the parameter α in
equation (5) of around -5 suggests that a credit supply shock that would have reduced
borrowing by 10% would raise the odds of bankruptcy by about e−5x10% ≈ 60%.
Corporate liquidations in England and Wales rose by around 60% between 2007 and
2009, while the stock of corporate debt fell by 7.5%. Assuming again that the fall in
corporate debt over this period represented a shock to credit supply, then multiplying
these numbers with the proportion of firms with bank debt suggests that the credit
shock may have accounted for almost half of the pick-up in company liquidations.
This calculation is illustrated in Table 10.
The estimates provided above are purely illustrative, but suggest the size of our
parameter estimates in Section 6 are not only statistically significant but also eco-
nomically large.
Table 10: Economic significance, firm survival
Calculation step Percent
Change in corporate debt, 2007 to 2009 (a) -8
Impact of 1% change in credit supply on probability of
bankruptcy (b)
6
Proportion of firms with bank debt (c) 60
Predicted pickup in liquidations, (a)x(b)x(c) 27
Actual pickup in liquidations, 2007 to 2009 59
Source: ONS; authors calculations.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the credit supply shock caused
by the financial crisis of 2008 on corporate outcomes in the UK.
We find that firms facing a reduction in credit supply experienced greater falls in
labour productivity and capital per worker. We argue that this is due to an increase
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in the shadow price of capital causing firms to substitute towards more labour-
intensive technologies in production. Our results suggest that a 10% contraction in
credit supply led, on average, to a 5-6% fall in capital per worker and a 5-8% in labour
productivity. The estimated impact on labour productivity is large, suggesting lower
capital investment may have been associated with lower levels of innovation and
technological development. However further research is needed in this area.
Our results also suggest average pay fell further in firms more exposed to the credit
shock, and in similar proportion to labour productivity, even though these firms were
hiring labour in the same markets as less exposed firms. We find that a 10% fall in
credit supply led, on average, to a 7-9% fall in average pay for the firms affected.
This suggests firms were able to share the impact of the credit shock with workers,
through lower wage growth.
We find that firms facing adverse credit supply shocks were more likely to fail. Our
results predict that a 10% decrease in credit supply would increase the probability
of bankruptcy by 60%.
These parameter estimates are both statistically significant and economically large.
They suggest that the credit supply shock caused by the recent financial crisis may
explain around 5-8 percentage points of the 17% shortfall in labour productivity
relative to its pre-crisis trend by 2013, half of the shortfall in wages, and nearly half
of the pickup in company liquidations between 2007 and 2009.
Our identification strategy relies on pre-crisis banking relationships that decay non-
randomly over time. A key limitation of this empirical design is that we are unable
to say how persistent these effects might be. Although we are only able to identify
the impact of the contraction in credit supply in 2008 and 2009, it may be that either
the shock was more persistent or the effects on the corporate sector longer lasting.
On the intensive margin, it could be that firms are somehow permanently scarred by
temporary credit shocks, or it could be that they are able to catch up to the coun-
terfactual pre-crisis trend path once the credit shock abates. And on the extensive
margin, this study does not tell us how firm entry is affected by credit supply, so we
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cannot say what happens to the factors that become unemployed when firms fail,
either during or after the period of crisis. Barnett et al. (2014) suggests impaired
capital allocation between firms may have been an important driver of the weakness
in productivity. There are also likely to have been factors, not covered in this study,
helping to keep unproductive firms alive after the crisis, including forbearance by
banks and the tax authorities, and low levels of interest rates (Barnett et al. (2014)).
Overall, the durability of the productivity slowdown since the crisis make this an
important avenue for future research.
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A Attrition and overidentification tests
To the extent that credit supply affects firm survival, it may also affect the results
of the standard tests of overidentification restrictions used to assess instrument va-
lidity. Standard tests of overidentifying restrictions work by looking how far from
zero our sample analogues b′ˆ of the population moment conditions E [ibi] = 0 are.
However, if there is nonrandom attrition in our sample, tests based on such overi-
dentifying restrictions are unlikely to work. In particular, if the disturbances in the
observation equation  are correlated with those in the selection equation u, and our
instrument d is a determinant of the latent selection variable f ∗ (this is a necessary
condition for identification), then in general our instrument will be correlated with
the disturbances in the observation equation, conditional on them being observed,
i.e.
E [b′|f ∗ > 0] 6= 0
To see this, assume that the moment condition E[b′] = 0 holds in the population.
However, what we observe is instead the sample analogue of E [b′|f ∗ > 0]
E [b′|f ∗ > 0] =Eb [E [b′|f ∗ > 0, b]]
=Eb [b
′E [|f ∗ > 0, b]]
=Eb
[
b′E
[
|αt∆̂di + βtxi + uit > 0, b
]]
=Eb
[
b′E
[
|uit > −αt∆̂di − βtxi, b
]]
Suppose for the sake of illustration that u and  are both mean zero, and jointly
normally distributed with covariance σu. Then
Eb
[
b′E
[
|uit > −αt∆̂di − βtxi, b
]]
=Eb
b′σu
σ
φ
(
−αt∆̂di−βtxi
σ
)
1− Φ
(
−αt∆̂di−βtxi
σ
)

6=0
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So in general, even if our identifying restrictions hold, our instruments will be corre-
lated with the residuals in the second-stage equations for the continuous variables.
The intuition is that our instruments determine selection, so they will be systemati-
cally related to the unobserved variables u in the selection equation among surviving
firms. The latter will be related systematically to the unobserved variables  to the
extent that firms which are more likely to survive are also more likely to invest, hire
labour, and so forth. This means that our instruments can be correlated with the
residuals of the second-stage equation, invalidating tests of validity based on overi-
dentifying restrictions. We may therefore reject the null of validity more frequently
than indicated by the significance level of the test.
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B Additional tables
Table 11: Summary statistics for a different sample of firms without debt, 2007
Variable Mean Median Min Max Obs
Capital (£’000s) 502 8 0 235,0106 55,579
[15,277]
Capital per worker (£’000s) 264 4 0 441,080 2,774
[8,480]
Turnover per head (£’000s) 435 110 -520 204,620 2,489
[4,474]
Average pay (£’000s) 38 29 0 908 3,023
[46]
Employment 109 13 1 25057 3422
[669]
Total sample size 86,378
Notes: See notes under Table 2. Standard deviations are shown in square brackets.
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Table 13: First stage, placebo regressions
Unbalanced Balanced
2006 2007 2006 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank 1 -0.021 -0.049** -0.020 -0.046**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Bank 2 0.019 -0.024 0.010 -0.030
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Bank 3 -0.001 -0.023 0.006 -0.021
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Bank 4 -0.013 -0.030 0.000 -0.026
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Other financial institution 0.001 -0.098*** -0.004 -0.103***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04]
Non financial institution -0.015 -0.025 -0.008 -0.025
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,862 11,266 10,532 10,532
F statistic 1.152 2.392 0.914 2.451
P-value of regression 0.269 8.74e-05 0.590 5.39e-05
P-value of all banks 0.655 0.127 0.849 0.139
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level. P-values
in square brackets. Table shows results from regressions on the change in debt, ∆debtit, on
a vector of bank dummies in 2005. ∆debtit is calculated using symmetric growth rates .
Each column represents a cross-sectional regression for the change in time t relative to 2005,
where t is (2006, 2007). Regressions control for industry sector, firm entity type, age and
log level of turnover in 2005. Balanced columns control for number of firms that have data
recorded in both years. Data are restricted to firms who have a positive level of debt in
2005.
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Table 14: Second stage, placebo regressions
∆yt−2005: 2006 2007
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital per head 0.137*** 0.503 0.148*** -0.161
[0.01] [0.44] [0.01] [0.31]
Turnover per head -0.011 0.239 0.004 0.525*
[0.01] [0.34] [0.01] [0.28]
Average pay -0.006 0.290 -0.008* 0.100
[0.01] [0.31] [0.00] [0.20]
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 10,421 10,421 10,421 10,421
P-value of instruments 0.791 0.163
Kleinbergen-Paap 0.954 2.492
Notes: *Significant at 10% level **significant at 5% level *** significant at 1% level.
P-values in square brackets. Table shows results from the second stage regressions
of the change in ∆yit, on the change in debt, ∆debtit, which is instrumented using
a vector of bank dummies in 2005. Changes in debt and y are calculated using
symmetric growth rates . Each column represents a cross-sectional regression for the
change in time t relative to 2005, where t is (2006, 2007). Regressions control for
industry sector, firm entity type, age and log level of turnover in 2005. Balanced
columns control for number of firms that have data recorded in both years. Firms
that have become inactive or are in liquidation are included in the sample as having
zero turnover. Failed firms are included as having zero turnover and zero assets. Data
are restricted to firms who have a positive level of debt in 2005.
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